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RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS  
New Hampshire Constitution, Part I, Article 6: 
 As morality and piety, rightly grounded on high principles, will give the best and greatest security to government, and will lay, in the hearts of men, the strongest obligations to due subjection; and as the knowledge of these is most likely to be propagated through a society, therefore, the several parishes, bodies corporate, or religious societies shall at all times have the right of electing their own teachers, and of contracting with them for their support or maintenance, or both. But no person shall ever be compelled to pay towards the support of the schools of any sect or denomination. And every person, denomination or sect shall be equally under the protection of the law; and no subordination of any one sect, denomination or persuasion to another shall ever be established. 
 
 
New Hampshire Constitution, Part II, Article 83: 
 Knowledge and learning, generally diffused through a community, being essential to the preservation of a free government; and spreading the opportunities and advantages of education through the various parts of the country, being highly conducive to promote this end; it shall be the duty of the legislators and magistrates, in all future periods of this government, to cherish the interest of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries and public schools, to encourage private and public institutions, rewards, and immunities for the promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce, trades, manufactures, and natural history of the country; to countenance and inculcate the principles of humanity and general benevolence, public and private charity, industry and economy, honesty and punctuality, sincerity, sobriety, and all social affections, and generous sentiments, among the people: Provided, nevertheless, that no money raised by taxation shall ever be granted or applied for the use of the schools or institutions of any religious sect or denomination. Free and fair competition in the trades and industries is an inherent and essential right of the people and should be protected against all monopolies and conspiracies which tend to hinder or destroy it. The size and functions of all corporations should be so limited and regulated as to prohibit fictitious capitalization and provision should be made for the supervision and government thereof. Therefore, all just power possessed by the state is hereby granted to the general court to enact laws to prevent the operations within the state of all persons and associations, and all trusts and corporations, foreign or domestic, and the officers thereof, who endeavor to raise the price of any article of commerce or to destroy free and fair competition in the trades and industries through combination, conspiracy, monopoly, or any other unfair means; to control and regulate the acts of all such persons, associations, corporations, trusts, and officials doing business within the state; to prevent fictitious capitalization; and to authorize civil and criminal proceedings in respect to all the wrongs herein declared against. 
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STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS 
 Governor Margaret Hassan has served as Governor of the State of New 
Hampshire since January 3, 2013.  As Governor, she is responsible for 
protecting the many rights and immunities enshrined in the New Hampshire 
Constitution.  She also is responsible for enforcing its many obligations and 
limitations on government.  Among these is an obligation to ensure that 
revenues generated through the taxation of New Hampshire citizens be put 
to constitutionally appropriate uses.   
The New Hampshire Constitution explicitly prohibits the use of 
“money raised by taxation”—i.e. public funds—for the benefit of “the schools 
or institutions of any religious sect or denomination,” N.H. CONST. part II, 
art. 83 (“Article 83”); see also N.H. CONST. part I, art. 6 (“Article 6”) (affirming 
that “no person shall ever be compelled to pay towards the support of the 
schools of any sect or denomination”).  In the Governor’s view, the superior 
court correctly concluded that the education tax credit program enacted 
under N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. (“RSA”) § 77-G violates this prohibition.  
Consistent with her responsibilities under the New Hampshire Constitution, 
and in the best traditions of previously elected leaders, the Governor files this 
amicus brief to explain her position on this important constitutional ruling 




STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 9, 2013, eight New Hampshire residents and a New 
Hampshire business entity challenged the constitutionality of the tax credit 
program enacted pursuant to RSA § 77-G in an action seeking injunctive and 
declaratory relief.  The State and four intervenors (three individuals and a 
New Hampshire non-profit business entity) defended.   
In an order dated June 17, 2013, the superior court (Lewis, J.) held 
that the program violates Article 83 insofar as it permits organizations 
authorized to receive donations subsidized by the tax credit to use those 
donations to fund student scholarships to religious, non-public schools.  Order 
at 40.  In so ruling, the court concluded, over the defendants’ objections, that 
the plaintiffs had standing to press their claims.  Id. at 14-20.  The court also 
concluded, over objections by the plaintiffs and the defendant-intervenors, 
that the program could continue to operate constitutionally so long as the 
revenue it generates is not used to fund student scholarships to religious, 
non-public schools.  Id. at 40-44.  The State and defendant-intervenors have 
filed timely appeals, and the plaintiffs have filed a timely cross-appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Governor adopts and incorporates by reference the Statement of 




SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Governor confines her argument in this amicus brief to whether 
the superior court correctly concluded that the education tax credit program 
enacted under RSA § 77-G violates Article 83 insofar as it permits 
organizations authorized to receive donations subsidized by the credit to use 
those donations to fund student scholarships to religious, non-public schools.  
In the Governor’s view, the superior court’s finding of unconstitutionality was 
correct.   
In its text, structure, and history (including its interpretive history), 
the New Hampshire Constitution significantly differs from the First 
Amendment’s Establishment Clause with respect to the question whether 
revenue generated through taxation—i.e., public funds—may be used to 
subsidize student scholarships to religious, non-public schools.  Accordingly, 
more permissive federal court precedents interpreting the Establishment 
Clause should have little bearing on this question.  Under the New 
Hampshire Constitution, the answer to the question is “no”; public funds may 
not be used to subsidize student scholarships to religious, non-public schools.  
Public financial support of religious schools would not only violate the 
constitutional rights of New Hampshire taxpayers who do not wish their tax 
dollars to subsidize the operation of such schools, but it also would 
necessitate additional public regulation of the affairs of religious schools.  
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Either way, the result would be a dangerous state entanglement in religion 
that is inconsistent with New Hampshire’s Constitution and traditions. 
The question therefore becomes whether the superior court correctly 
concluded that revenue raised and appropriated through the tax credit 
program enacted pursuant to RSA § 77-G constitutes “money raised by 
taxation” within the meaning of Article 83.  The superior court’s conclusion 
was correct.  The monies made available to schools through RSA § 77-G are 
monies raised by taxation.  The legislature has appropriated a portion of New 
Hampshire’s tax dollars to pay for scholarships to religious schools through 
the tax credit program.  Any other conclusion would require this Court to 
bless a formalistic and functionally meaningless distinction between tax 
dollars appropriated directly by the State, and tax dollars directed to 
religious schools through the tax credit program legislation.  Such a crabbed 
reading of the Article 83 guarantee would jeopardize both the hallowed 
underpinnings of religious tolerance and freedom, and the prohibition against 
entanglement made sacred by our New Hampshire Constitution.  This Court 
should not vindicate a formalism that would enable an easy end-run around a 
basic constitutional limit on the power of the State with respect to taxpayer 
funds.  
Finally, the violation of Article 83 occasioned by RSA § 77-G is no mere 
technical breach of the wall of separation between church and state.  The 
Governor views tax incentives as appropriate tools of public policy when 
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revenues are allocated to constitutional uses. Moreover, nothing prevented 
individuals or businesses from contributing to private religious schools of 
choice—and from enjoying the federal tax benefits of such contributions—
before RSA § 77-G was adopted, and nothing prevents them from doing so 
now.  Yet § 77-G creates a vehicle by which substantial sums of public 
revenue raised through the taxation of New Hampshire citizens would be 
diverted to religious, non-public institutions.  Such a financially imprudent 
diversion of scarce tax dollars would undermine the State’s ability to meet its 
other obligations in the coming years, including the provision of an adequate 
education for all New Hampshire children; providing New Hampshire’s civil 
and criminal justice systems with adequate resources to ensure the delivery 
of justice in New Hampshire; and maintaining the health, safety and well-
being of New Hampshire’s citizens.   
The superior court’s order should be affirmed. 
 
ARGUMENT 
I.   Notwithstanding Permissive Federal Precedent Interpreting the 
Federal Establishment Clause, the New Hampshire Constitution 
Clearly Prohibits the Use of Public Funds to Subsidize Student 
Scholarships to Religious, Non-public Schools.          In relevant part, the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”  The 
quoted text constitutes the entirety of the federal Constitution’s religion 
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clauses—i.e., its Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.  The federal 
Constitution makes no mention of public funding for religious schools or 
institutions.  Thus, federal Establishment Clause precedent setting limits on 
what legislatures may do in connection with directing public funds to 
religious schools and institutions has developed over time as a species of 
constitutional common law, unmoored from the federal Constitution’s less-
than-illuminating text. 
 The text of the New Hampshire Constitution is far more specific on 
this issue. Indeed, two separate provisions explicitly express an 
unwillingness on the part of New Hampshire citizens to see public funds 
directed to religious schools or institutions.  Article 6, titled “Morality and 
Piety,” states: 
As morality and piety, rightly grounded on high principles, will 
give the best and greatest security to government, and will lay, 
in the hearts of men, the strongest obligations to due subjection; 
and as the knowledge of these is most likely to be propagated 
through a society, therefore, the several parishes, bodies 
corporate, or religious societies shall at all times have the right 
of electing their own teachers, and of contracting with them for 
their support or maintenance, or both.  But no person shall ever 
be compelled to pay towards the support of the schools of any 
sect or denomination.  And every person, denomination or sect 
shall be equally under the protection of the law; and no 
subordination of any one sect, denomination or persuasion to 
another shall ever be established.  
 
N.H. CONST. part 1, art. 6 (emphasis supplied).   
Moreover, Article 83, titled “Encouragement of Literature, Etc.” in 
relevant part states: 
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Knowledge and learning, generally diffused through a 
community, being essential to the preservation of a free 
government; and spreading the opportunities and advantages of 
education through the various parts of the country, being highly 
conducive to promote this end; it shall be the duty of the 
legislators and magistrates, in all future periods of this 
government, to cherish the interest of literature and the 
sciences, and all seminaries and public schools, to encourage 
private and public institutions, rewards, and immunities for the 
promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce, trades, 
manufactures, and natural history of the country; to 
countenance and inculcate the principles of humanity and 
general benevolence, public and private charity, industry and 
economy, honesty and punctuality, sincerity, sobriety, and all 
social affections, and generous sentiments, among the people:  
Provided, nevertheless, that no money raised by taxation shall 
ever be granted or applied for the use of the schools or 
institutions of any religious sect or denomination.  
 
N.H. CONST. part. II, art. 83 (emphasis supplied). 
Given the profound textual differences between the federal and state 
constitutions, it is evident that permissive federal court precedents 
interpreting the Establishment Clause should have little bearing on this 
Court’s analysis of the principal question raised by these cross-appeals.  The 
text of the New Hampshire Constitution makes it plain that public subsidies 
raised through the taxation of New Hampshire citizens cannot be used to 
defray the costs of attending religious, non-public schools.  Significantly, this 
constitutional prohibition protects both secular and religious interests.  
Obviously, it protects the rights of those who do not want their tax dollars to 
subsidize religious education.  But by foreclosing an entanglement that 
surely would bring additional public oversight and regulation, it also 
safeguards the liberty of religious schools and institutions themselves.       
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Many provisions of the New Hampshire Constitution are more 
protective of constitutional liberty than corresponding provisions in the 
United States Constitution.  See State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 232-33 (1983) 
(collecting examples).  This Court must accord such provisions their proper 
scope and breadth as a matter of New Hampshire constitutional law.  Indeed, 
the Court has forcefully stated that to do otherwise would constitute a failure 
to safeguard the federalism that is so cherished by the New Hampshire 
citizenry.  See id. at 231.  Articles 6 and 83 of the New Hampshire 
Constitution are far more protective of constitutional liberty than the 
Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution.  The Court should 
recognize them as such.  
II.  The Superior Court Correctly Concluded That the Monies Made 
Available to Schools Through RSA § 77-G are Monies “Raised by 
Taxation” Within the Meaning of Article 83. 
 
The superior court ruled that RSA § 77-G effectively appropriates 
“public funds,” or “money raised by taxation,” when it grants tax credits to 
offset business donations to approved scholarship organizations.  Order at 26.  
The Governor—who is constitutionally responsible for the “faithful execution 
of the laws,” Article 41—strongly endorses the superior court’s well-reasoned 
ruling.  This Court should affirm that providing tax credits against the 
business profits and business enterprise taxes constitutes an expenditure of 
“money raised by taxation” pursuant to Article 83. 
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The program enacted by RSA § 77-G permits businesses to pay a 
portion of their due and owing taxes—i.e., the “public funds” for which they 
are legally responsible—to a legislatively approved entity for a legislatively 
desired purpose instead of paying those taxes directly to the State.  Either 
way, the funds in question are “public funds” that may be used only for 
specific, state-designated purposes.  Under no circumstances are these funds 
available to the donor businesses for private uses.   
 By statute, the state budgeting process involves projecting the 
“expenditure needs of the government” and identifying “the means through 
which such expenditures will be financed,” RSA § 9:3, I(a), including 
“estimated revenues . . . on the basis of existing laws,”  RSA § 9:3, I(c).  
Existing laws include the business profits tax, RSA § 77-A, and the business 
enterprise tax, RSA § 77-E.  The General Court passed these laws, and the 
then-sitting Governors signed them into law, in order to raise revenues to 
meet the State’s obligations in a responsible manner. 
 To find that the funds generated by these tax credits are not “money 
raised by taxation” would require the indulgence of a meaningless formalism 
that ignores New Hampshire’s long-standing tradition of treating tax credits 
and exemptions as equivalent to tax expenditures.  See Morrison v. 
Manchester, 58 N.H. 538, 1879 WL 4100, *14 (1879) (declaring that a tax 
“exemption is an expenditure of public money”); State v. U.S. & Canada 
Express Co., 60 N.H. 219, 1880 WL 10588, *36 (1880) (“The generation by 
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whom the constitution was adopted understood the state could pay a sum of 
money to an individual, for a public purpose, by exempting him from the 
payment of the same amount of tax.”); Canaan v. District, 74 N.H. 517, 537 
(1908) (declaring that “all exemptions from taxation are practically 
equivalent to a direct appropriation”); Eyers Woolen Co. v. Town of Gilsum, 
84 N.H. 1, 146 A. 511, 516 (1929) (“A special tax exemption is one form of 
appropriating public money.”); Opinion of the Justices, 109 N.H. 578, 579, 
581-82 (1969) (finding bill that would allow $50.00 property tax credit to 
parents of children attending a nonpublic school unconstitutional because it 
constituted public funds that could be contributed to non-secular schools).  
Indeed, the Governor is aware of no New Hampshire case law suggesting that 
tax credits are anything other than the expenditure of public funds.  
   This longstanding treatment of tax credits as expenditures of public 
funds recognizes the reality that state government relies on revenues 
generated through taxation to fulfill its duties and obligations.  In 
discharging her obligation to prepare balanced biennial state budgets 
pursuant to RSA § 9:2, the Governor must account for all legally obligated 
expenditures, including those that will be accomplished through tax credits.  
A legislative act that directs public funds away from the State for a 
designated state-directed purpose is functionally indistinguishable from a 
legislative expenditure of funds already in the State’s treasury.  Both use 
publicly designated funds to accomplish a state-directed purpose, and both 
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constitute the expenditure of “public funds” or “money raised by taxation.” 
Pursuant to the program enacted by RSA § 77-G, money that would 
otherwise be flowing directly to the State is diverted for the very specific and 
direct purpose of providing scholarships to students at non-public schools, 
including religious schools.  
The Court should not vindicate a formalism that would enable an easy 
end-run around a basic constitutional limit on the power of the State with 
respect to taxpayer funds.  It should affirm the superior court’s conclusion 
that the tax credits authorized by RSA § 77-G are monies “raised by taxation” 
within the meaning of Article 83. 
III.  RSA § 77-G Downshifts Education Expenses to Local Property 
Taxpayers and Undermines the State’s Ability to Meet Its Other 
Obligations in Coming Years. 
 
As set forth above, RSA § 77-G fails constitutional scrutiny under 
Article 83 insofar as it functions to channel tax dollars to scholarships that 
benefit religious schools.  Moreover, this constitutional violation is no mere 
technical breach of the wall of separation between church and state.  While 
the Governor applauds the creative use of tax incentives as appropriate tools 
of public policy when revenues are allocated to constitutional uses, RSA § 77-
G would divert substantial sums of public revenue to religious schools.  The 
effect would be to place even greater burdens on local property taxpayers and 
to undermine the State’s ability to meet its other obligations, such as the 
provision of an adequate education to all New Hampshire children; providing 
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New Hampshire’s civil and criminal justice systems with adequate resources 
to ensure the delivery of justice in New Hampshire; and maintaining the 
safety and well-being of New Hampshire’s citizens.  
The Governor has a duty to be fiscally responsible; she must ensure 
the efficient and proper use of tax dollars for legitimate public purposes.  RSA 
§ 77-G would greatly undermine this task.  If permitted to go into full effect, 
it would result in multi-million-dollar losses to local school districts.  Such 
losses would be a consequence of the reductions in state adequacy aid to 
public schools that the program mandates.  See New Hampshire Department 
of Education Projections, Plaintiffs’ Appendix at 1377, 1380, 1384, 1388–89; 
see also id. at 79.  These losses to local districts would be many times greater 
than the initial, modest savings the program might generate at the state 
level, see id. at 1377, 1380, 1388–89, and will accrue over at least 16 years, 
see RSA § 77-G:2, I(b).    
Moreover, these losses are unlikely to fall evenly across the State.  
Given the nature of the program, school districts in which religious schools 
are located will likely be more significantly affected by student transfers and 
the consequent loss of adequacy funding.  RSA § 77-G does not take into any 
account whatsoever the inability of school districts that will be most harmed 
to make up their losses through additional local property taxation. Although 
the tax credit program provides for stabilization grants in RSA § 77-G:8, such 
grants do not sufficiently offset losses in adequacy funding.  See RSA 77-G:8, 
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I. Moreover, the stabilization grants must be funded somehow, and there is 
no mechanism to raise additional monies to fund such grants (which will 
undoubtedly require additional taxpayer dollars).  While the program is 
projected to last more than 16 years, the partial hold-harmless grants to 
school districts last no more than four years.  Compare RSA § 77-G:2, I(b) 
with RSA § 77-G:8, I.  Thus, a school district whose second grader transfers 
away as a result of the program loses the adequacy funding associated with 
that child when she reaches sixth grade.  RSA § 77-G:8, I.   This loss is hardly 
offset by cost savings achieved from the departure of a single student from a 
class of, say, 20.  Application of RSA § 77-G over time would negatively 
impact local public schools and taxpayers.  
Moreover, the burden on New Hampshire taxpayers resulting from the 
diversion of tax dollars would be substantial.  New Hampshire has a unique 
and carefully guarded taxing scheme.  The education tax credit program 
would permit the diversion of $3.4 million in taxes in 2013 and $5.1 million in 
2014, with the opportunity for the total to escalate in future years pursuant 
to RSA § 77-G:4, II-III.  If certain conditions are met, the State could 
experience a diversion of more than $30 million in taxes by 2022 and more 
than $300 million by 2033.  See Plaintiffs’ Appendix at 54.  Permitting such a 
diversion of scarce taxpayer resources would undermine the State’s ability to 
discharge its fiscal responsibilities.  
Nothing prevented individuals or businesses from contributing to 
 15 
private religious schools of choice—and from enjoying the federal tax benefits 
of such contributions—before RSA § 77-G was adopted, and nothing prevents 
them from doing so now.  In fact, private donations enable such schools to 
offer scholarships directly to students who would otherwise not be able to 
afford the education.  But public funds cannot and should not be put to the 
same use.    
The Governor treasures the diversity of private schools in our state, 
and fully appreciates their contributions to tolerance and learning.   But the 
decision to contribute to a private religious school is a personal decision.  It 
should not be supported by the State’s tax structure, and it should not have 
the effect of diverting scarce taxpayer dollars from crucial public needs.  The 
superior court’s finding that RSA § 77-G violates Article 83 should be 
affirmed.    


